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ABSTRACT
Prior literature suggests that a focus on employee and customer relations alone improves
financial performance. However, I find that a focus on employee and customer relations alone is
not related to higher earnings persistence, but rather I hypothesize and find that the alignment of
employee and customer relations with competitive strategy is related to higher earnings
persistence. I further explore this relation by examining the contextual environment in which the
firm operates. I consider the moderating variables of firm size, leverage, growth, and corporate
governance and find that alignment impacts the persistence of earnings for leverage and
governance but not for firm size or growth. I then examine the relation between a firm’s
alignment and the market’s reaction to the firm’s reported earnings. The analysis suggests that
alignment is critical for cost leaders but is relatively less important for differentiators. Taken as
a whole the findings suggest that firm alignment plays a role in earnings quality and is useful to
investors in their interpretation of earnings.

vii

I. INTRODUCTION
This study examines how earnings persistence is impacted when a firm’s employee and
customer relations are aligned with the firm’s competitive strategy. The literature supports the
position that strong employee and customer relations lead to persistent earnings (Heskett et al.,
2008; Heskett et al., 1994), but earnings persistence has not been the focus of these previous
studies and was not tested directly. I specifically test the persistence of earnings and examine the
market’s reaction to reported earnings based on the alignment of the firm’s employee and
customer relations with its competitive strategy. My findings suggest that alignment is
associated with more persistent earnings and is understood by market participants including
financial analysts.
Strong employee and customer relations lead to high levels of customer satisfaction
regarding the firm (Heskett et al., 2008), help connect customers to the brand (Bhattacharya and
Sen, 2004), and thereby improve the firm’s reputation (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). Highly
satisfied customers are brand-loyal customers, and these branding and reputational benefits
generate higher revenues (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Mescon and Tilson, 1987; Heskett et al.,
1994) and lower operating costs through greater employee retention and productivity (Willard,
2002). Higher revenues and lower costs lead to higher profits, creating stability for the firm even
during difficult economic times. By building strong employee and customer relations, firms tend
to increase total earnings and earnings persistence, which has been shown to improve the
company’s resilience to recessions (Godfrey, 2005).
The emphasis placed on employee and customer relations varies by firm, and this
variation should be highly correlated with the competitive strategy chosen by the firm. Porter
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(1998) argues a firm’s competitive strategy can be described as one of three basic approaches:
the differentiator, the cost leader, or “caught in the middle”. The differentiator is able to earn a
higher gross margin on its products by creating the perception of uniqueness. The cost leader’s
competitive position in the marketplace is maintained by structuring its operations for high
volume at the lowest possible cost, resulting in a relatively lower gross margin per transaction,
but offset by higher sales volume. Porter (1998) contends that “caught in the middle” is a
strategy firms should attempt to avoid. So while a firm can create value for its customers
through high quality employee and customer relations, comparisons between firms that focus on
employee and customer relations and those that do not should be considered within a given
competitive strategy rather than between strategies. The relative importance of persistent
earnings within a given competitive strategy should be similar and comparable but the relative
importance of persistent earnings might not hold in comparisons between strategies.
Miles and Snow (1978) describe the focus a firm places on employee and customer
relations as changing through time. Firms are always seeking to “adapt” their structures and
strategies to properly align themselves within their competitive marketplace (Miles and Snow,
1985). Alignment is not a status that once achieved, no longer needs to be addressed, but rather,
alignment is a continuous process whereby a firm constantly makes changes to achieve optimal
performance within a given competitive strategy. Through the development of a high level of
alignment the firm is able to generate more predictable earnings which, in turn, lowers estimation
risk for financial statement users (Sant and Cowan, 1994). The literature suggests that lower
estimation risk increases the precision of market participant’s estimates (Barry and Brown, 1985;
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Merton, 1987). More persistent earnings in combination with more
precise estimates, increase financial statement user’s confidence in reported numbers. As
2

investors rely more heavily on earnings, the relative importance of analysts’ forecasts declines.
Analysts have less “new” information to share with investors as more information is capture by
earnings. This study shows that alignment between the firm’s focus on employee and customer
relations and the firm’s competitive strategy, provide relatively more persistent earnings and this
increase in earnings quality is understood by market participants.
In this study I contrast firms that have aligned their investment in employee and customer
relations with the firm’s competitive strategy (Aligned Firms) with those that have not aligned
their investment in employee and customer relations with the firm’s competitive strategy
(Misaligned Firms), and I hypothesize that earnings persistence will be higher for Aligned Firms
than for Misaligned Firms. I test this hypothesis using both a simple model with no control
variables as well as a model that includes controls variables which follow prior literature. I then
examine key firm characteristics: firm size, the level of firm indebtedness, the level of firm
growth, and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance and consider the impact each of
these characteristics have on earnings persistence for Aligned and Misaligned Firms.
I find that simply focusing on employee and customer relations alone does not result in
higher earnings persistence; however, Aligned Firms are associated with higher earnings
persistence. The results further suggest that it is this alignment of the firm’s focus with its
competitive strategy that is critical in understanding earnings persistence when considering the
level of firm indebtedness, and corporate governance. My results provide no support for the
existence of a relation between earnings persistence and firm size or the level of firm growth.
Additionally I test the relation between abnormal return and unexpected earnings for Aligned
and Misaligned Firms. I find a strong positive relation between unexpected earnings and
abnormal returns for Aligned Firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy, but no relation between
3

unexpected earnings and abnormal returns for Aligned firms pursuing a differentiator strategy.
These results are further supported by my findings in relation to the incremental explanatory
power of consensus analysts’ forecasts. For Aligned Firms, both differentiators and cost leaders,
exhibit lower incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts as compared to Misaligned
Firms. I interpret this finding to suggest that Aligned Firms have more information captured by
earnings leaving analysts with less opportunity to incrementally add to the market’s
understanding through their forecast.
This study contributes to the literature by showing that the alignment of a firm’s focus on
employee and customer relations and its chosen competitive strategy is useful in understanding
earnings persistence. The study also shows that the market is aware of the importance of
alignment and that market participants seek out additional information in the absence of
alignment. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly discusses
related literature and develops the hypothesis; Section III describes the sample selection and
defines the variables used in the analysis; Section IV explains the design of the research
methodology; Section V presents the empirical results; and Section VI summarizes the findings
from the study, discusses known limitations and concludes.
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II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The interconnection between employee and customer relations is well founded in the
literature, and employee satisfaction is the beginning step in a chain of cause-and-effect relations
which lead to improved profitability. Employee satisfaction fuels employee loyalty and
productivity, which in turn boosts the level of value provided to the firm’s customers, which then
increases customer satisfaction and loyalty (Heskett et al., 1994). Customer satisfaction has been
linked to firm profitability (Luo and Homburg, 2007) a willingness to pay a premium (Homburg
et al., 2005), a decrease in sensitivity to price changes (Stock, 2005), and an increase in the
likelihood of becoming a repeat customer (Mittal and Kamakura, 2001; Olsen, 2002). Firms
with brand-loyal customers generate higher revenues (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Mescon and
Tilson, 1987; Heskett et al., 1994) and enjoy lower operating costs through greater employee
retention and productivity (Willard, 2002). Higher revenues and lower costs lead to higher
profits. This chain of cause-and-effect relationships suggests that if a firm invests in its
employee and customer relations, the firm should generate more persistent earnings, a quality
that is important to current and future investors as well as financial analysts (Verrecchia, 2001;
Barron et al., 2009; Demirakos et al., 2004).
However, the decision to invest in employee and customer relations must be considered
in the context of the competitive strategy chosen by the firm. Porter (1998) classifies a firm’s
competitive strategy as one of the following: a differentiator, a cost leader, or “caught in the
middle”. Following this classification, a differentiator is a firm that provides a good or service
that is perceived by the customers to possess certain unique features. It is this uniqueness that
allows the differentiator to earn a higher gross margin than its competitors. On the other hand,
the cost leader structures its operations to minimize costs. The cost leader charges a lower price
5

for its product and is willing to earn a lower gross margin per unit with the expectation that the
cost leader will be able to sell relatively more units. Porter (1998) recommends firms avoid
being “caught in the middle”. This system of classification for competitive strategy provides a
reasonable basis for comparison, but just because a firm has chosen to compete within a given
competitive marketplace does not mean the firm has aligned all of its operations to be effective
with a given competitive environment.
Miles and Snow (1978) describe an iterative process whereby firms adjust their focus in a
step-by-step process over time. This process should lead firms to make changes in all aspects of
the business, including, but not limited to, changes in the firm’s product offerings, distribution
system, technological inputs, communication and control processes, organizational structures, as
well as processes that enable evolution and innovation. Through a process of organized change
over time the focus of the firm and the competitive strategy of the firm can more optimally align.
The idea that alignment of the firm’s operational and organizational structures with the firm’s
strategy will facilitate efficient operations and drive long-term success is supported by a body of
earlier research (Drucker, 1974; Child, 1972; Perrow, 1967; Chandler, 1962). A firm that is
taking steps to become an Aligned Firm is pursuing the set of cause-and-effect relations,
described by Heskett et al. (1994) which lead to more persistent earnings. The proper focus on
employee and customer relations, for a particular competitive strategy, will produce more
persistent earnings as compared to a focus on employee and customer relations that is misaligned
with the competitive strategy of the firm. Given the broad scope of competitive strategy is seems
that analysis between Aligned and Misaligned Firms should be performed within a given
competitive strategy rather than between strategies. This leads to H1, which is as follows:
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H1: Earnings persistence is higher for Aligned Firms as compared to Misaligned
Firms.
The existing literature has noted several variables to be significant in considering the
focus of a firm within its competitive surroundings. To address the role of the contextual
environment, this study considers the impact of these key firm characteristics. The
characteristics, deemed moderating variables, are as follows: firm size, the level of firm
indebtedness, the level of firm growth, and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance.
These additional refinements of the analysis allow for a better understanding of the underlying
relations and for a clearer interpretation of the regression results.
The first of these moderating variables is firm size. Firm size is an important firm
characteristic and has been shown to influence statistical results in countless studies across a
wide range of relations. As there are fundamental differences in the operations of large versus
small firms, it is not surprising that this firm characteristic has been shown to be important in the
analysis of a firms competitive focus (Waddock & Graves, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001;
Prior et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012). The market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for growth.
Following Kim et al. (2012), growth is included in the study due to its significance in the
analysis of prior studies. Leverage, or the level of firm indebtedness, has been studied as a
possible constraint on firm spending (Barnea & Rubin, 2010); however, in this study leverage is
used as a proxy for distressed firms. Highly leveraged firms face additional risks, like
continuing as a going concern, which are not an issue for firms with low levels of debt (McGuire
et al., 1988). Corporate governance serves as a proxy for a monitoring mechanism within the
firm that increases the credibility of a firm’s reporting. Kim et al. (2012) discuss the importance
of governance as a separate construct and in their analysis they control for the impact of
governance (Klein, 2002; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006) rather than include it within their
7

composite score of KLD strengths and concerns. As such, corporate governance is examined as
a separate construct herein.
In considering firm size, positive accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986),
specifically, the political cost hypothesis, suggests that large firms are subject to greater scrutiny
than small firms and therefore larger firm are subject to higher reporting standards. Small firms
have a greater need to communicate information about themselves to outside parties, because
smaller firms are less well-known. Firms that focus on employee and customer relations are
associated with higher visibility, stronger reputation, and higher brand recognition (Fombrun &
Shanley, 1990; Verschoor, 2005; Linthicum et al., 2010; Mescon & Tilson, 1987; Varadarajan &
Menon, 1988), which suggests that small firms with a focus on employee and customer relations
have more to gain by the increased exposure than would a large firm, as the large firm is already
well-known. Therefore the impact of exposure related characteristics is likely to have a greater
impact on small firms compared to large firms. As such H2(a) is as follows:
H2(a): The earnings persistence of small Aligned Firms should be higher as
compared to larger firms.
In considering the level of firm indebtedness, highly leveraged firms are more likely to be
financially distressed and prior literature has shown management of financially distressed firms
make decisions that impact the reported accounting fundamentals differently than their nonfinancially distressed counterparts (Mercer, 2004). Therefore financially distressed firms are
subjected to different stimuli as compared to firms that are not financially distressed, proxied
here as low levels of debt. Highly leveraged firms are unlikely to fully enjoy the benefits
typically associated with Aligned Firms, as the burden created by the debt will likely subsume
most, if not all, of the benefit created from proper alignment. For firms with comparatively
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lower debt levels the benefits typically associated with Aligned Firms will not be overshadowed
by their relatively less burdensome debt structure and therefore one would expect to see higher
levels of earnings persistence for firms with relatively lower levels of leverage. As such H2(b) is
as follows:
H2(b): The earnings persistence of Aligned Firms with low levels of indebtedness
should be higher as compared to firms with relatively higher levels of
indebtedness.
In considering firm growth, firms with high levels of growth are less likely to be
impacted by being an Aligned Firm because growth is such an important aspect of their business
model. Penman and Zhang (2002) point out that firm growth serves to reduce current earning by
creating reserves on the balance sheet that make the firm’s current accounting fundamentals less
predictive of the future. Conversely, low growth firms are likely to be highly impacted by firm
alignment. For low growth firms, an investment in the firm’s employee and customer relations
only needs to create a small impact in the firm’s earnings for the change to be detected by
financial statement users. Alternatively, a small change driven by these activities at a growth
firm might simply be attributed to the firm’s growth and as such the incremental impact would
be less detectible. Therefore, H2(c) is as follows:
H2(c): The earnings persistence of Aligned Firms with low levels of growth
should be higher as compared to firms with relatively higher levels of
growth.
Strong corporate governance serves to inhibit managerial misconduct and adds credibility
to other signals the firm might provide (Wu, 2012). Therefore a strong corporate governance
environment impacts the reporting process both directly, through the controls in place that
govern financial reporting, and indirectly, through an environment that eschews managerial
misconduct. Additionally, well governed firms are more like to retain high quality auditors as
9

compared to their more poorly governed counterparts. Regardless of the direction of this
relation, whether well governed firms seek out high quality auditors or if it is the high quality of
the audit that causes the firm to be well governed, these two are clearly linked. Strong corporate
governance seems to add validity to the actions of the firm and therefore increases the predictive
power of the firm’s earnings and book value. As a result H2(d) is as follows:
H2(d): The earnings persistence of Aligned Firms with high levels of corporate
governance should be higher as compared to firms with relatively lower
levels of corporate governance.
The literature provides evidence regarding the likely relation Aligned Firms have with
earnings persistence as well as with the moderator variables, but is the relation between Aligned
Firms and earnings persistence understood by market participants? This question motivates my
third hypothesis. If Aligned Firms are associated with higher levels of earnings persistence
investors should value the reported earnings of Aligned Firms more than those of Misaligned
Firms. Similarly, if Aligned Firms enjoy higher earnings persistence then by definition current
earnings better explain next period’s earnings. As current earnings better explain future
earnings, the explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts must decline. Therefore, the persistent
earnings of Aligned Firms reduce the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts, as
compared to Misaligned Firms, and the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is
predicted to be lower for Aligned Firms, relative to Misaligned Firms. As a result H3 is
formally stated as follows:
H3: Market participants place more confidence in earnings and relatively less
confidence in analysts’ forecasts for Aligned Firms as compared to
Misaligned Firms.
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III. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Each hypothesis in this study addresses either directly or indirectly the relation between
Aligned Firms and earnings persistence. To evaluate these hypothesizes, I first determine which
firms are Aligned and which are misaligned. This evaluation is based on a firm’s focus on
employee and customer relations which is operationalized using the Kinder, Lydenburg, and
Domini (KLD) rating system. I proxy for the quality of the firm’s employee relations using the
KLD rating of “Employee Relations” and use KLD’s rating of “Product Quality” as a proxy for
customer relations. The use of “Product Quality” as a proxy for the customer’s perspective is
supported by academic research that suggests that product quality has a significant impact on
customer satisfaction and even delivers a greater impact than does the product’s price (Fornell et
al., 1996).
KLD data is often associated with corporate social responsibility and has been called the
de facto leader in estimating a firm’s involvement in the greater good of society (Waddock,
2003). In this study, I use only a subset of KLD’s measures that support the set of cause-andeffect relations described by Heskett et al. (1994). The KLD rating system evaluates the
performance of each firm included in the dataset across seven qualitative areas and six
controversial business segments, assessing a rating of the firm’s strengths and concerns in each.
If a firm is assessed by KLD to possess a strength in the qualitative area of “Employee
Relations”, “Product Quality”, or both, I classify this firm as a Focused Firm; otherwise the firm
is classified as a non-Focused Firm.
I do not utilize KLD’s assessment of the controversial business segments, nor do I
consider any assessment of concerns. The controversial business segments are not used as they
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are specifically designed to capture firm behavior KLD has deemed unacceptable from the
perspective of corporate social responsibility. As corporate social responsibility is not the focus
of this study, KLD’s designation of a firm as being involved in a controversial business segment
is not relevant. KLD’s assessment of concerns is excluded in an effort to focus the study and
limit its scope. The prior literature includes studies that choose to net KLD strengths and
concerns, however the creation of a composite score is not a sound theoretical decision and is not
supported by the work of Mattingly and Berman (2006). Mattingly and Berman (2006) test the
validity of netting KLD strengths and concerns and find the empirical results do not provide
support for the creation of a composite score.
To determine the classification of a firm as Aligned or Misaligned I layer the competitive
environments discussed by Porter (1998) on top of the Focus or non-Focus of the firm. I
partition my data based on gross margin percentage calculated as total revenue minus cost of
goods sold divided by total revenue. I ordered the firms based on gross margin percentage from
highest to lowest and assigned firms in the top quartile to the top partition (Top Partition), firms
in the bottom quartile to the bottom partition (Bottom Partition), and the remaining two middle
quartiles are designated as the middle partition. Using these partitions I define Aligned and
Misaligned Firms as follows: in the Top Partition, Aligned Firms are Focused Firms, and
Misaligned Firms are non-Focused Firms; in the Bottom Partition, Aligned Firms are nonFocused Firms and Misaligned Firms are Focused Firms, as described in Figure 1. According to
Porter (1998) the Top Partition includes the differentiators who earn a relatively high gross
margin by creating the perception of uniqueness with their product offerings. Therefore these
firms should be focused on employee and customer relations in an effort to develop this
perception of uniqueness. The Bottom Partition, on the other hand, contains firms Porter (1998)
12

describes as cost leaders. These firms maintain their competitive advantage through careful cost
management, and as such, a focus on employee and customer relations would be viewed as an
additional cost layer for the cost leader. Therefore cost leaders should not focus the firm’s
resources on developing strong employee and customer relations.

Focused Firms

Non-Focused Firms

Top Partition
(Top 25% GM)

Bottom Partition
(Bottom 25% GM)

Aligned Firms

Misaligned Firms

Misaligned Firms

Aligned Firms

Figure 1
Definition of Aligned and Misaligned Firms

The literature indicates that certain firm characteristics are likely to influence the relation
between Aligned Firms and earnings persistence. As such the analysis is structured to consider
the influence of these specific firm characteristics, deemed moderator variables. To investigate
the impact of these moderators (H2), I use an additional partition of the data based on the relative
magnitude of the moderator within the distribution. The moderator variables are indicator
variables, and therefore the partition in the data is formed between the top 50% of the
distribution versus the bottom 50% of the distribution within the sample.
The moderating variables are defined as follows: firm size, leverage, growth, and
corporate governance. The proxy for Firm Size (Sizei,t) is an indicator variable having a value of
one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is smaller than the median for the
sample and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. The proxy for Leverage (Levi,t) is an indicator
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variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is larger than the median
for the sample and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. The proxy for Growth (MBi,t) is an
indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is larger than the
median for the sample and zero otherwise, where the market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as
the market value of equity over book value of equity for firm i at time t. The proxy for
Corporate governance (Govi,t) is an indicator variable having a value of one if the net KLD rating
for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns is
greater than zero and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
The window of time covered by this study was impacted by the implementation of
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 which went into effect for all fiscal years
beginning after December 15th, 2001. This standard addresses the accounting for goodwill and
other intangibles. Positive employee and customer relations is not typically captured by
accounting, however; should a firm record goodwill, positive employee and customer relations
would be capitalized onto the firms balance sheet. As the implementation of the standard would
change the only way employee and customer relations is directly recorded into the accounting
records the sample period was restricted, such that all observations included in the sample would
fall under the same regulatory guidance.
The sample began with all firms listed in the Compustat database during the sample
window. This provided an initial sample of 146,523 firm-years. As Table 1 shows, 59,045 firmyear observations were lost due to missing Compustat data. An additional 15,473 observations
were deleted as they were related to financial industry firms and the definition of key financial
metrics is different for financial firms. Due to a lack of data needed to calculate the necessary
lagged variables, 17,276 observations were deleted. The merge with the KLD dataset reduced
14

the sample by an additional 37,024 firm-years, and 8,853 observations were lost as they were
classified as “caught in the middle”. This resulted in the full sample consisting of 2,165 firms
TABLE 1
Sample Selection
Firm-year
Observations

Description
Firm-years list on Compustat for the sample period

146,523

Less: Firm-years with missing Compustat data

59,045

Less: Firm-years associated with financial firms

15,473

Less: Firm-years lacking the necessary lagged variables

17,276

Less: Firm-years missing KLD data

37,024

Less: Firm-years from the middle partition, "caught in the middle"

8,853

Full Sample consisting of 2,165 firms from 2002 to 2011

8,852

Less: Firm-years with missing IBES data

3,665

Less: Firm-years with missing CRSP data

457

Less: Firm-years missing the necessary variables

Reduced Sample consisting of 648 firms from 2002 to 2011

1,579

3,151

covering 8,852 firm-years. To test the market’s reaction to the relation between earnings
persistence and firm alignment, additional restrictions had to be placed on the data. The merge
of the sample with the IBES database reduced the number of usable observation by another
15

3,665, and 457 more firm-year observations were lost due to the merge with the CRSP dataset.
An additional 1,579 firm-year observation were deleted as they were missing the necessary
variables to conduct the analysis, bringing the final sample to 3,151 firm-year observations for
648 firms covering the period from 2002 to 2011. The continuous variables for all observations
were winzorized at the one-percent level.
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
The study’s design rests upon the relation between the firm alignment and earnings
persistence. Because Focused Firms include a focus on either employee, customer relations, or
both, I begin the analysis with each run separately and then progress to the base model, first
without controls and then adding the controls from prior literature as well as industry and year
dummy variables. The full model, including all controls, is presented below:
Ei,t+1 = α0 + α1Ei,t + α2Aligni,t + α3(Ei,t*Aligni,t) +α4LgSIi,t +α5Lossi,t + α6Intgblei,t
+ α7Agei,t + α8Repi,t + α9R&Di,t + α10Advi,t + αiInd_Dummiesi,t +
αjYr_Dummiesi,t + ε1i,t
(1)
where Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but includes special items, defined as net income
plus discontinued operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t, and
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, LgSIi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms
with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total special
items that exceed 1% of average total assets following Elliott and Shaw (1988) for firm i at time
t, Lossi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with net income that is less
than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Intgblei,t is an indicator variable having the
value of one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for
firm i at time t, Agei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if firm age is greater than the
sample median and a zero otherwise, where firm age (Age1) is the sum of the number of years
since firm i was first listed on Compustat at time t, Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable
having the value of one if firm i is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and a
zero otherwise at time t, R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s
research and development expense is greater than zero and a zero otherwise where research and
17

development expense (R&D1) is calculated as research and development expense divided by net
sales for firm i at time t, Advi,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if advertising
expense was greater than zero and a zero otherwise, where advertising expense (Adv1) is
calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t, Ind_Dummiesi,t is an
indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is included in the industry portfolio and a
zero otherwise, where the industry portfolios is one of the twelve Fama French industry
portfolios defined by SIC code, and Yr_Dummiesi,t is an indicator variable having the value of
one if the observation is for the given year and a zero otherwise.1
Additional analysis is conducted by examining the impact of the moderators on the
relation between earnings persistence and alignment. To conduct this analysis the data is parsed
between Top and Bottom Partitions and then within each partition the data is further parsed into
Aligned and Misaligned Firms. Within these partitions the relation of interest is the interaction
between earnings and the moderator. The full model, including all controls, is presented below:
Ei,t+1 = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Moderatori,t + β3(Ei,t*Moderatori,t) + β4LgSIi,t + β5Lossi,t +
β6Intgblei,t + β7Agei,t + β8Repi,t + β9R&Di,t + β10Advi,t + βiInd_Dummiesi,t
+ βjYr_Dummiesi,t + ε2i,t
(2)
where Moderatori,t is one of the following: Largei,t, Levi,t, MBi,t, or Govi,t and all other variables
are as previously defined.
To examine the market’s reaction to the relation between alignment and earnings
persistence I conduct an analysis of the incremental explanatory power of earnings and analysts’
forecasts. Because Aligned Firms should enjoy greater earnings persistence, Aligned Firms
should have lower incremental explanatory power from analysts’ forecasts as related to future
1

The work of Chiu and Sharfman (2011) and Torelli et al. (2012) among others suggest that firm visibility is a
control that should be considered in this analysis. Therefore, I initially included visibility as a control variable in the
analysis and found it to be insignificant, as such; firm visibility was dropped from the analysis.
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earnings. To test this expectation, I follow a methodology used by Collins et al. (1997), and
created three versions of the full model presented below:
Pricei,t = λ0 + λ1Ei,t + λ2
+ λ3LgSIi,t + λ4Lossi,t + λ5Intgblei,t + λ6Agei,t
+ λ7Repi,t + λ8R&Di,t + λ9Advi,t + λiInd_Dummiesi,t + λjYr_Dummiesi,t +
ε3i,t
(3)
where Pricei,t is the closing price on the last day of the fiscal year for firm i at time t, Forecasti,tt-1
is the first consensus analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s announcement for the
current year end for firm i at time t, and all other variables are as previously defined. I first run
Eq. (3) excluding Forecasti,tt-1. I then run Eq. (3) excluding Ei,t. The final step is to run Eq. (3) in
its full model form as presented above. By subtracting the R2 of the first version of Eq. (3) from
the R2 of the full model of Eq. (3) the resulting difference is the incremental predictive power
provided by analysts’ forecasts. This difference indicates the ability of analysts’ forecasts to
explain next period’s price beyond the explanation provided by earnings. As stated in H3, I
expect Aligned Firms to demonstrate relatively stronger earnings persistence; therefore, the
incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts will be relatively weak.
To further test the market’s understanding of the relation between alignment and earnings
persistence I test the incremental impact of Aligned Firms on the relation between abnormal
return and unexpected earnings. This test is conducted following the model used by Freeman
and Tse (1989) presented below:
AbReti,t = ω0 + ω1UEi,t + ω2Aligni,t + ω3(UEi,t*Aligni,t) + ω4FirmSizei,t + ω5Lossi,t
+ ω6Betai,t + ω7DtoEi,t + ω8Analystsi,t + ε4i,t
(4)
where AbReti,t is the daily compounded return from one day after the prior periods
announcement date to one day after the current period’s announcement date less the mean return
from the firm’s Scholes-Williams (1977) beta decile for firm i at time t, UEi,t is unexpected
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earnings calculated as current period earnings less the first consensus analysts’ forecasts
provided after the prior year’s announcement for the current year end for firm i at time t,
FirmSizei,t is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for firm i at time t, Betai,t is the
firm beta as defined by Scholes-Williams (1977) for firm i at time t, DtoEi,t is the debt to equity
ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total equity for firm i at time t, Anlaystsi,t is the number
of analysts following the firm as reported by IBES for firm i at time t, and all other variables are
as previously defined. In addition to calculating abnormal return following Freeman and Tse
(1989), the analysis was also conducted following the definition of abnormal return used by
Abarbanell and Bushee (1998), where abnormal return is the daily compounded return as defined
before less the mean daily compounded return from the value-weighted firm size decile for firm i
at time t.
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V. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics related to the full sample are presented in Table 2 Panel A. In
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
Variables
Mean
Ei,t
0.012
Ei,t+1
0.008
LgSIi,t
0.078
Lossi,t
0.183
Intgblei,t
0.808
Age1i,t
21.970
Repi,t
0.105
R&D1i,t
0.332
Adv1i,t
0.014
Sizei,t
7.085
Levi,t
0.168
MBi,t
3.397
Govi,t
0.115

Median
0.041
0.042
0.000
0.000
1.000
15.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
6.879
0.134
2.320
0.000

Std. Dev.
0.150
0.156
0.269
0.386
0.394
16.331
0.307
1.549
0.035
1.560
0.171
3.335
0.319

Min
-0.650
-0.693
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.065
0.000
0.489
0.000

25th %
0.000
-0.001
0.000
0.000
1.000
9.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
5.949
0.001
1.476
0.000

75th %
0.083
0.082
0.000
0.000
1.000
32.000
0.000
0.091
0.009
8.007
0.277
3.941
0.000

Max
0.260
0.254
1.000
1.000
1.000
61.000
1.000
12.189
0.239
11.448
0.660
20.160
1.000

Panel B: Partitioned Sample
Top Partition
Bottom Partition
Variable
Mean
Median
Std Dev
Mean Median
Std Dev
Ei,t
0.057
0.061
0.107
-0.033
0.027
0.172
Ei,t+1
0.048
0.059
0.120
-0.031
0.030
0.178
LgSIi,t
0.073
0.000
0.261
0.083
0.000
0.276
Lossi,t
0.107
0.000
0.309
0.258
0.000
0.438
Intgblei,t
0.812
1.000
0.391
0.805
1.000
0.396
Age1i,t
20.559
15.000
15.540
23.380
16.000
16.968
Repi,t
0.089
0.000
0.285
0.121
0.000
0.326
R&D1i,t
0.096
0.012
0.355
0.567
0.000
2.135
Adv1i,t
0.023
0.003
0.044
0.005
0.000
0.020
Sizei,t
7.347
7.150
1.598
6.824
6.622
1.476
Levi,t
0.153
0.097
0.175
0.182
0.159
0.166
MBi,t
4.023
2.935
3.559
2.771
1.875
2.966
Govi,t
0.128
0.000
0.334
0.102
0.000
0.303
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011.
The Top Partition consists of 4,423 firm-year observations while the Bottom Partition consists of 4,429 firmyear observations.
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued
operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large
special items is defined as total special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise
for firm i at time t.
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(Table 2 continued)
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero
otherwise for firm i at time t.
Age1i,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t.
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired
Companies list and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
R&D1i,t is calculated as research and development expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t.
Adv1i,t is calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t.
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is
smaller than the median and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is smaller than the
median and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is smaller than the median
and zero otherwise, where the market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity
over book value of equity for firm i at time t.
Govi,t is the net KLD rating for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number
of concerns for firm i at time t.

general, I find no unexpected anomalies in the data and the variables appear to be consistent with
extant literature. Almost 8% of the firm-year observations included a large special item with
over 18% of the observations being periods where the firm experienced a loss. The sample tends
to be composed of mature firms with an average age of almost 22 years, which is consistent with
Kim et al. (2012). However, the mean for firm age is somewhat inflated by very mature firms as
the median age in the sample is somewhat less at only 15 years. As captured by Repi,t, over 10%
of the sample is listed on Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” list. Research and
development costs with a mean of 0.332 are slightly higher as compared to the sample examined
by Kim et al. (2012), while advertising expenses with a mean of 0.014 are slightly lower than
this previous study. The size of the firms in the sample tends to be quite large, even slightly
larger than the firms considered by Kim et al. (2012). Large firms are expected in this sample as
firm size is a characteristic used in KLD’s selection process. In considering Levi,t and MBi,t the
mean of both appear reasonable in comparison to the levels reported by Kim et al. (2012).
Additionally, in untabulated results, Aligned Firms make up just over 52% of the sample.
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Panel B, Table 2, presents comparative descriptive statistics between the Top and Bottom
Partitions which are based on gross margin percentage. The Top Partition consists of 4,423 firmyear observations while the Bottom Partition includes 4,429 firm-years. Firms in the Top
Partition, on average, exhibit higher current period earnings (Ei,t), which seems reasonable given
the partition is based on gross margin percentage. In untabulated results, the Top Partition is
composed of 24.7% Aligned Firms while the Bottom Partition contains 79.4% Aligned Firms.
Top Partition firms also tend to be younger, by more than three years, are less well-known as
captured by the reputation variable, spend more on research and development and advertising,
and have higher levels of growth, than their bottom partition counterparts. However the strength
of the corporate governance environment is statistically the same between the partitions.
I present the Pearson correlations above the diagonal and the Spearman correlations
below the diagonal, in Table 3. Ei,t is highly positively correlated with Ei,t+1, and negatively
correlated with Lossi,t, at statistically significant levels. Aligni,t is positively correlated with Ei,t
as well as Lossi,t, Intgblei,t, Age1i,t, Repi,t, and Levi,t, but negatively correlated with Ei,t+1, LgSIi,t,
R&D1i,t, Adv1i,t, Sizei,t, MBi,t, and Govi,t. Interestingly, Table 3 indicates that firm size is not
correlated with the level of either research and development expense or advertising expense
based on the Pearson correlations but are statistically significant following the Spearman
correlation.
Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis of the relation between
earnings persistence and firm alignment, partitioned based on the magnitude of the firm’s gross
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TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix - Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) - (p-values shown in italics below correlation)
Ei,t
Ei,t+1 Aligni,t LgSIi,t Lossi,t Intgblei,t Age1i,t Repi,t R&D1i,t Adv1i,t
Sizei,t
Levi,t
MBi,t
Govi,t
1.000 0.714
0.171 0.016 -0.687
0.192 0.160 0.126 -0.5307 0.0599
0.366 -0.041 -0.041 0.012
<.0001 <.0001 0.1390 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2651
Ei,t+1
0.716 1.000 -0.147 -0.036 -0.571
0.189 0.167 0.128 -0.5199 0.0543
0.349 0.001 0.031 0.012
<.0001
<.0001 0.0008 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9268 0.004 0.2461
Aligni,t
0.160 -0.128
1.000 -0.016 0.106
0.040 0.049 0.047 0.1154 -0.1475
-0.023 0.031 -0.076 -0.019
<.0001 <.0001
0.1343 <.0001
0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0321 0.0033 <.0001 0.0813
LgSIi,t
0.018 -0.027 -0.016 1.000 0.060
-0.064 -0.097 -0.042 0.0512 0.0033 -0.061 0.028 0.084 -0.021
0.0828 0.0121 0.1343
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7549 <.0001 0.0092 <.0001 0.0537
Lossi,t
-0.621 -0.494
0.106 0.060 1.000
-0.253 -0.191 -0.135 0.3995 -0.0315
-0.338 -0.099 0.096 0.011
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0031 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2844
Intgblei,t
0.106 0.104
0.040 -0.064 -0.253
1.000 0.106 0.130 -0.2102 0.0104
0.205 0.104 -0.104 -0.025
<.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3276 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0205
Age1i,t
0.137 0.144
0.060 -0.147 -0.199
0.101 1.000 0.289 -0.1497 -0.0707
0.389 0.111 -0.120 0.004
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7315
Repi,t
0.157 0.154
0.047 -0.042 -0.135
0.130 0.266 1.000 -0.0667 0.0269
0.508 0.020 0.037 -0.001
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
<.0001 0.0114 <.0001 0.0583 0.0005 0.9258
R&D1i,t
-0.1685 -0.1453 -0.0161 0.0191 0.3657 -0.0263 -0.1747 -0.0598 1.0000 -0.0334 -0.1524 -0.0770 0.1487 0.0005
<.0001 <.0001 0.1294 0.0721 <.0001
0.0134 <.0001 <.0001
0.0017 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9655
Adv1i,t
0.1619 0.1502 -0.1814 -0.0271 -0.0927
0.0916 -0.0486 0.0231 0.0206 1.0000 0.0498 -0.0762 0.1264 0.0316
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0108 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0297 0.0529
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0029
Sizei,t
0.407 0.401 -0.046 -0.065 -0.355
0.213 0.334 0.428 -0.0635 0.0615
1.000 0.073 0.174 -0.062
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Levi,t
-0.175 -0.140
0.054 0.012 -0.139
0.139 0.166 0.067 -0.3158 -0.0952
0.159 1.000 0.018 -0.081
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2737 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.0841 <.0001
MBi,t
0.313 0.346 -0.112 0.053 0.020
-0.087 -0.146 0.071 0.3072 0.1240
0.301 -0.141 1.000 0.013
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0631 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.2118
Govi,t
0.032 0.022 -0.019 -0.021 0.011
-0.025 -0.012 -0.001 -0.0091 0.0041 -0.093 -0.088 0.029 1.000
0.0026 0.0368 0.0813 0.0537 0.2844
0.0205 0.2399 0.9258 0.3931 0.6969 <.0001 <.0001 0.0067
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011.
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes all
scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Ei,t
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(Table 3 continued)
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total
special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t.
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Age1i,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t.
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and a zero otherwise
for firm i at time t.
R&D1i,t is calculated as research and development expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t.
Adv1i,t is calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t.
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is smaller than the median and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t.
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is smaller than the median and zero otherwise for
firm i at time t.
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is smaller than the median and zero otherwise, where the
market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity over book value of equity for firm i at time t.
Govi,t is the net KLD rating for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns for firm i at time t.
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TABLE 4
Tests of the persistence of earnings
Ei,t+1 = α0 + α1Ei,t + α2Aligni,t + α3(Ei,t*Aligni,t) + α4LgSIi,t + α5Lossi,t + α6Intgblei,t + α7Agei,t + α8Repi,t + α9R&Di,t + α10Advi,t +
αiInd_Dummyi,t + αjYr_Dummyi,t + ε1i,t
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Employee
Customer
Either
Either
Employee
Customer
Either
Either
Intercept
0.025 ***
0.025 *** 0.009 *** 0.025 ***
0.023 **
0.015
0.007 *
0.021 **
Ei,t
0.562 ***
0.561 *** 0.632 *** 0.553 ***
0.502 ***
0.598 *** 0.679 *** 0.507 ***
Aligni,t
0.006 *
-0.007
0.006
0.004
-0.010 *
-0.001
-0.015 *** -0.008 *
Ei,t*Aligni,t
0.004
0.106
0.080 **
0.073 *
0.080 ***
-0.026
0.099 *** 0.077 ***
LgSIi,t
-0.005
-0.006
-0.005
-0.017 ***
-0.017 ***
-0.017 ***
Lossi,t
-0.044 ***
-0.044 ***
-0.044 ***
-0.054 ***
-0.054 ***
-0.054 ***
Intgblei,t
-0.005
-0.004
-0.005
0.010 **
0.010 **
0.010 **
Agei,t
0.005
0.006 *
0.005
0.013 ***
0.013 ***
0.013 ***
Repi,t
0.014 **
0.018 ***
0.014 **
0.009
0.009 *
0.008
R&Di,t
-0.001
0.000
-0.001
-0.029 ***
-0.029 ***
-0.028 ***
Advi,t
0.005
0.005
0.005 *
0.002
0.002
0.002
Includes industry and year dummies
N
4,423
4,423
4,423
4,423
4,429
4,429
4,429
4,429
Adj R2
0.3743
0.3737
0.3378
0.3520
0.6055
0.6044
0.5494
0.6055
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011, and *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes
all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total
special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t.
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable of one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Agei,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t.
Repi,t is an indicator variable of one for firms on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and development expense is greater than zero and a zero
otherwise firm i at time t.
Advi,t is an indicator variable of one if the firm’s advertising expense is greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.

26

margin percentage. The table includes analysis for firms with a focus on employee relations,
customer relations, as well as either employee or customer relations. The data was run
separately for employee and customer relations to ensure that combining the two together did not
produce an anomalous result. In Table 4 the relation of interest is the interaction between
earnings and alignment (Ei,t*Aligni,t). In the Top Partition the interaction term is 0.004 and
0.106 for employees and customers, respectively, and both are statistically insignificant. In the
Bottom Partition the interaction term for employees is 0.080 and is statistically significant while
the interaction term for customers is -0.026 but statistically insignificant. After considering both
the statistical significance of these coefficients and their sign I concluded that it was reasonable
to conduct the remaining analysis by considering firms focused on either employee relations,
customer relations, or both.
H1 predicts that in both the Top Partition and in the Bottom Partition, Aligned Firms will
have more persistent earnings than Misaligned Firms. For both partitions H1 is supported. In
the Top Partition the support for H1 is somewhat weak, and appears to be impacted by the
inclusion of the controls, with an interaction term of 0.073 that is significant at the 10% level. In
the Bottom Partition the support for H1 is strong, with an interaction term of 0.077 that is
significant at the 1% level. The stronger relation associated with the Bottom Partition, or the
cost leaders, seems reasonable in that cost leaders are highly focused on costs. For a firm in the
Bottom Partition, allocating the firm’s resources to initiatives that promote strong employee and
customer relations effectively creates an additional cost layer for the firm. Such actions work
directly contrary to the competitive strategy of the firm. Therefore the need to maintain
alignment between the firm’s competitive strategy and the firm’s operational decisions is critical
for the cost leader. For firms in the Top Partition, or differentiators, a lack of focus on employee
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or customer relations might not create a direct impact to the firm in the short run. Additionally,
due to the relatively high gross margin enjoyed by firms in the Top Partition, these firms have
added flexibility in their operational choices. This flexibility is likely to lead firms in the Top
Partition to try “new” approaches from time to time. As with anything, some of these changes
will be successful but others will not. This flexibility with mixed results could partially explain
the weaker results for the Top Partition. However, when viewed as a whole, these results
support H1, Aligned Firms are associated with relatively higher levels of earnings persistence.
In an effort to ensure that alignment was critical I also examined the relation between
firms that simply focused on employee or customer relations, without regard to whether this
focus created alignment with the firm’s competitive strategy or not (Focused Firms). In
untablulated results, I interact Focused Firms with earnings and estimate the coefficients. This
interaction results in a negative and significant coefficient which suggests that firms that are not
Focused Firms would enjoy higher earnings persistence as compared to Focused Firms. This
finding supports the position that focusing on employee and customer relations is not enough.
For a firm to reap the benefits of focus on employee and customer relations, that focus needs to
align with the firm’s competitive strategy or else the firm’s action may serve to hinder earnings
persistence.
The alignment of a firm’s focus on its employee and customer relations is different in
each classification of competitive strategy. A focus on the firm’s employee and customer
relations would align with the competitive strategy of a differentiator. Here the firm has chosen
to position itself to provide a unique product and charge a relatively higher price for the product.
To follow this strategy the firm needs for its customers to be highly satisfied with the product
offering. For a firm following a cost leadership strategy, employee and customer relations are of
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less importance with the emphasis being placed on lowering costs. Under this competitive
strategy fostering strong employee and customer relations creates an additional layer of expense
within the firm’s cost structure and therefore constitutes a misalignment from the firm’s chosen
competitive strategy. Porter (1998) argues that competitive strategies are not absolute in that
differentiators must consider cost impacts and cost leaders must maintain some level of product
quality. Likewise firm alignment or misalignment between the firm’s focus on its employee and
customer and its chosen competitive strategy is also relative to one another and not absolute, but
the results suggest that alignment is critical in understanding the persistence of earnings.
Table 5 presents the results of the interaction between earnings and the moderators for
both the Top and Bottom Partition. The relation between alignment and earnings persistence is
further explored by examining the impact of four firm characteristics, termed moderators, which
the extant literature suggests are worthy of consideration within this setting. Specifically, these
four firm characteristics are firm size, the level of firm indebtedness, firm growth, and the
strength of the firm’s corporate governance. In this analysis the relation of interest is the
interaction term between earnings and the moderator. Therefore the predictions for H2(a) thru
H2(d) will be evaluated based on this coefficient (β3).
The results for the first moderator examined, firm size, are presented in Table 5 Panel A.
H2(a) states that small firms are most likely to benefit from being an Aligned Firm. The
hypothesis suggests that the incremental effect of firm size on earnings persistence will be
strongest for small, Aligned Firms. However the results suggest that firm size is not a significant
factor. The difference between Aligned and Misaligned Firms in the Top and Bottom Partition is
0.075 and -0.026, respectively and both are statistically insignificant. The results in Panel A do
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TABLE 5
Tests of the persistence of earnings for moderator variables
Ei,t+1 = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Moderatori,t + β3(Ei,t*Moderatori,t) + β4LgSIi,t + β5Lossi,t + β6Intgblei,t + β7Agei,t + β8Repi,t + β9R&Di,t + β10Advi,t
+ βiInd_Dummyi,t + βjYr_Dummyi,t + ε2i,t
Panel A:Firm Size
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
Intercept
-0.022
0.022 **
-0.044 **
Ei,t
0.583 ***
0.522 ***
0.061
Sizei,t
0.030 ***
0.027 ***
0.003
Ei,t*Sizei,t
0.085
0.009
0.075
LgSIi,t
-0.009
-0.004
-0.005
Lossi,t
-0.008
-0.043 ***
0.035 **
Intgblei,t
0.009
-0.012 ***
0.021 **
Agei,t
0.002
0.001
0.001
Repi,t
0.004
0.004
0.001
R&Di,t
0.006
-0.003
0.009
Advi,t
0.005
0.005
-0.001
Includes industry and year dummies
N
1,094
3,329
Adj R2
0.3693
0.3811

Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
0.003
0.040 **
-0.037 *
0.585 ***
0.554 ***
0.031
0.026 ***
0.025 ***
0.002
-0.184 ***
-0.158 ***
-0.026
-0.012
-0.025 **
0.013
-0.062 ***
-0.026 **
-0.036 ***
0.010 *
-0.017 *
0.027 **
0.011 ***
-0.001
0.012
-0.005
0.014 *
-0.019
-0.030 ***
-0.019 **
-0.011
0.001
-0.002
0.002
3,516
0.6120

913
0.5920

Panel B:Leverage

Intercept
Ei,t
Levi,t
Ei,t*Levi,t
LgSIi,t
Lossi,t
Intgblei,t
Agei,t
Repi,t

Aligned
-0.005
0.692 ***
-0.003
-0.037
-0.008
-0.013
0.014
0.005
0.010 *

Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Misaligned
Difference
0.029 ***
-0.034 *
0.586 ***
0.105 **
0.003
-0.006
-0.156 ***
0.119
-0.004
-0.003
-0.046 ***
0.033 **
-0.007
0.021 **
0.005
0.000
0.018 *
-0.008
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Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
0.010
0.056 ***
-0.046 **
0.625 ***
0.545 ***
0.080 **
0.003
-0.016 **
0.019 **
-0.172 ***
-0.035
-0.136 ***
-0.012 *
-0.026 **
0.014
-0.062 ***
-0.023 **
-0.040 ***
0.012 **
-0.008
0.020 *
0.014 ***
0.002
0.011
0.005
0.017 **
-0.012

(Table 5 continued)
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
R&Di,t
0.007
-0.001
0.008
Advi,t
0.006
0.004
0.002
Includes industry and year dummies
N
1094
3329
Adj R2
0.3578
0.3748

Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
-0.029 ***
-0.023 ***
-0.006
0.001
-0.001
0.003
3516
0.6114

913
0.5857

Panel C:Growth
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
Intercept
-0.035 **
0.015
-0.050 ***
Ei,t
0.541 ***
0.351 ***
0.190 **
MBi,t
0.044 ***
0.028 ***
0.016 **
Ei,t*MBi,t
0.087
0.213 ***
-0.126
LgSIi,t
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
Lossi,t
-0.013
-0.050 ***
0.038 ***
Intgblei,t
0.021 **
-0.006
0.027 ***
Agei,t
0.003
0.008 **
-0.006
Repi,t
0.005
0.007
-0.003
R&Di,t
0.003
-0.006
0.009
Advi,t
0.004
0.003
0.001
Includes industry and year dummies
N
1094
3329
Adj R2
0.3918
0.3941

Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
0.004
0.032 *
-0.028
0.424 ***
0.444 ***
-0.020
0.025 ***
0.036 ***
-0.011
0.222 ***
0.140 ***
0.082
-0.012 *
-0.029 **
0.017
-0.067 ***
-0.024 **
-0.044 ***
0.013 **
-0.005
0.018
0.017 ***
0.003
0.014
0.001
0.011
-0.011
-0.030 ***
-0.023 ***
-0.007
0.001
0.000
0.001
3516
0.6164

913
0.6014

Panel D: Governance

Intercept
Ei,t
Govi,t
Ei,t*Govi,t
LgSIi,t
Lossi,t

Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
-0.004
0.031 ***
-0.035 *
0.678 ***
0.552 ***
0.126 ***
-0.010
0.011 *
-0.021
0.096
-0.072 *
0.168
-0.009
-0.005
-0.004
-0.013
-0.049 ***
0.036 **
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Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
0.008
0.047 ***
-0.039 **
0.568 ***
0.555 ***
0.013
0.007
-0.008
0.015
0.048
-0.116 *
0.164 **
-0.013 *
-0.029 **
0.017
-0.060 ***
-0.023 **
-0.038 ***

(Table 5 continued)
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
Aligned
Misaligned
Difference
Intgblei,t
0.013
-0.008 *
0.021 **
0.015 ***
-0.012
0.027 **
Agei,t
0.004
0.004
0.000
0.015 ***
0.002
0.013
Repi,t
0.010
0.017 *
-0.007
0.005
0.018 **
-0.013
R&Di,t
0.007
-0.002
0.008
-0.030 ***
-0.018 **
-0.012
Advi,t
0.005
0.005
0.001
0.002
-0.001
0.003
Includes industry and year dummies
N
1094
3329
3516
913
Adj R2
0.3575
0.3715
0.6060
0.5848
The full sample consists of 8,852 firm-year observations for 2,165 firms covering the period from 2002-2011, and *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes
all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total
special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at time t.
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time
t.
Agei,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t.
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list and a zero
otherwise for firm i at time t.
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and development expense is greater than zero and a zero
otherwise firm i at time t.
Advi,t is an indicator variable of one if the firm’s advertising expense is greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Moderatori,t is one of the following:
Sizei,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market value of equity is smaller than the median
and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Levi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets is smaller than the median and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t.
MBi,t is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is smaller than the median and zero
otherwise, where the market-to-book equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity over book value of equity for
firm i at time t.
Govi,t is the net KLD rating for corporate governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns for firm
i at time t.
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not support H2(a) but rather suggest that firm size is not an important influence on earnings
persistence.
Table 5 Panel B reports the analysis for leverage as the moderator variable. H2(b)
suggests that earnings persistence will be higher for firms with relatively lower levels of debt.
The results in the Top Partition provide no support for H2(b). The difference in the interaction
term in the Top Partition is 0.119 and is statistically insignificant. However in the Bottom
Partition the difference in the interaction term is -0.136 and is statistically significant at the 1%
level. These results suggest that leverage is not all that important in the relation with earnings
persistence for differentiators, but a high level of leverage is negatively associated with earnings
persistence for the cost leader. I interpret these results to indicate that leverage is little more than
a financing choice for the differentiator, presumably, because generating the necessary cash to
pay off this debt is achievable for a firm with a relatively high gross margin. However for the
cost leader, who tends to be more entrenched in a given line of business and generates relatively
low gross margins, high levels of debt have a destructive impact on earnings persistence. The
results in Panel B do not support H2(b) in the Top Partition but do support H2(b) in the Bottom
Partition.
Table 5 Panel C reports the analysis for firm growth as the moderator variable. H2(c)
suggests that earnings persistence will be higher for firms with relatively lower levels of growth.
The results in the Top Partition provide no support for H2(c). The difference in the interaction
term in the Top Partition is -0.126 and is statistically insignificant. Likewise the results in the
Bottom Partition provide no support for H2(c). In the Bottom Partition the difference in the
interaction term is 0.082 and is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that firm growth
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is not an important factor in the relation with earnings persistence for differentiators or for cost
leaders.
Table 5 Panel D reports the analysis for corporate governance as the moderator variable.
H2(d) suggests that earnings persistence will be higher for firms that are relatively well
governed. The results in the Top Partition provide no support for H2(d). The difference in the
interaction term in the Top Partition is 0.168 and is statistically insignificant. However in the
Bottom Partition the difference in the interaction term is 0.164 and is statistically significant at
the 5% level. These results suggest that corporate governance is not all that important in the
relation with earnings persistence for differentiators, but firms competing as cost leaders enjoy
more persistent earnings if they have high levels of corporate governance. Beyond just the
difference in the coefficients in this panel is the negative and significant coefficient for
Misaligned Firms in both partitions. I interpret this finding to indicate that well governed
Misaligned Firms are restrained in their ability to manipulate earnings and therefore these firms
are subject to more volatility in their reported earnings. This increase in volatility reduces
earnings persistence and drives the negative sign reported in Table 5 Panel D.
Table 6 presents the first set of results designed to consider the market’s reaction to firm
alignment. The previous analysis all focused on the relation between Aligned Firms and
earnings persistence, with results that suggest that there is a positive relation between these two.
This next series of tests are designed to determine if the relation between Aligned Firms and
earnings persistence is understood by market participants.
Table 6 examines earnings persistence parsed between the Top and Bottom Partitions,
based on gross margin, and then parsed again between Aligned and Misaligned Firms. In this
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analysis I indirectly test the explanatory power of earnings by examining the R2 from three
different versions of Eq. (3). In Panel A the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that
excluded consensus analysts’ forecasts to provide an R2 that captures the explanatory power of
earnings. In Panel B the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that excluded current
earnings and therefore provide an R2 that captures the explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts.
And then in Panel C the analysis is conducted using the full model of Eq. (3) that included both
consensus analysts’ forecasts and current earnings. The analysis is then based on the R2 from the
three versions of the model. Subtracting the R2F in Panel B from the R2EF in Panel C results in
the incremental explanatory power of earnings as reported in Panel A. Subtracting the R2E in
Panel A from the R2EF in Panel C results in the incremental explanatory power of analysts’
forecasts as reported in Panel B, and it is this estimation that is of most interest.
If market participants understand the relation between Aligned Firms and earnings that is
documented in Table 4 then they should place greater confidence in the reported earnings of
Aligned Firms as compared to Misaligned Firms. As users of financial reporting place more
emphasis on current earnings due to their higher persistence, the relative earnings persistence,
with results that suggest that there is a positive relation between these two. This next series of
tests are designed to determine if the relation between Aligned Firms and earnings persistence is
understood by market participants.
Table 6 examines earnings persistence parsed between the Top and Bottom Partitions,
based on gross margin, and then parsed again between Aligned and Misaligned Firms. In this
analysis I indirectly test the explanatory power of earnings by examining the R2 from three
different versions of Eq. (3). In Panel A the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that
excluded consensus analysts’ forecasts to provide an R2 that captures the explanatory power of
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TABLE 6
Tests of the market reaction to firm alignment using analysts’ forecasts
Pricet = λ1 + λ2Ei,t + λ3Forecasti,tt-1 + λ4LgSIi,t + λ5Lossi,t + λ6Intgblei,t + λ7Agei,t + λ8Repi,t + λ9R&Di,t +
λ10Advi,t + λiInd_Dummyi,t + λjYr_Dummyi,t + ε3i,t
Panel A: Analysis with Earnings only
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Intercept
13.844 **
21.364 ***
Ei,t
68.111 ***
68.835 ***
LgSIi,t
1.359
-6.004 **
Lossi,t
-6.722
-7.269 **
Intgblei,t
3.368
3.714 *
Agei,t
6.950 ***
1.189
Repi,t
8.511 ***
11.624 ***
R&Di,t
-2.205
1.818
Advi,t
-1.032
-7.530 ***
Includes industry and year dummies
N
549
795
Adj R2E
0.2400
0.1889
Incremental Explanatory Power of Earnings
R2EF - R2F
0.0097
0.0165
Panel B: Analysis with Forecast only
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Intercept
15.437 ***
12.291 ***
Forecasti,t
8.248 ***
9.262 ***
LgSIi,t
5.328
-4.586 *
Lossi,t
-5.802
-0.722
Intgblei,t
1.639
2.821
Agei,t
1.296
-0.936
Repi,t
5.104 ***
5.256 **
R&Di,t
0.793
2.133
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Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
14.791 ***
31.614 ***
66.542 ***
49.916 ***
-8.510 ***
-2.286
-1.911
-5.768 *
2.243
2.853
3.461 ***
-1.810
12.882 ***
11.064 ***
3.558 ***
4.313 *
-2.889 **
-2.637
1,130
0.2677

329
0.2668

0.0271

0.0266

Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
11.516 ***
21.811 ***
6.311 ***
5.968 ***
-4.132
0.821
-2.973 *
-4.290 *
-0.992
0.414
3.085 ***
-1.280
5.833 ***
9.318 ***
4.317 ***
3.994 *

(Table 6 continued)
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Advi,t
-1.688
-3.614 ***
Includes industry and year dummies
N
549
795
Adj R2F
0.4091
0.4328
Incremental Explanatory Power of Forecast
R2EF - R2E
0.1788
0.2604

Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
-2.359 **
-3.359 *
1,130
0.4136

329
0.4345

0.1730

0.1943

Panel C: Analysis with both Earnings and Forecast
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Aligned
Misaligned
Aligned
Misaligned
12.786 ***
10.268 ***
9.426 ***
20.309 ***
Intercept
34.037 ***
38.275 ***
47.557 ***
42.620 ***
Ei,t
7.779 ***
8.798 ***
5.934 ***
5.824 ***
Forecasti,t
4.258 **
-4.947 **
-5.840 **
-1.161
LgSIi,t
-0.436
3.737
3.688 *
2.297
Lossi,t
1.893
3.507 **
-0.275
0.188
Intgblei,t
1.769
-0.667
3.058 ***
-1.628
Agei,t
5.015 ***
5.372 **
6.232 ***
8.419 ***
Repi,t
0.201
1.875
3.832 ***
4.297 **
R&Di,t
-1.920
-4.128 ***
-2.790 **
-2.942
Advi,t
Includes industry and year dummies
N
549
795
1,130
329
Adj R2EF
0.4188
0.4493
0.4407
0.4611
The reduced sample consists of 3,151 firm-year observations for 648 firms covering the period from 20022011, and *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. In the table
above R2E is the R2 from the analysis that includes earnings only, R2F is the R2 from the analysis that
includes analysts’ forecasts only, and R2EF is the R2 from the analysis that includes earnings and analysts’
forecasts.
Pricei,t is the closing price on the last day of the fiscal year as reported by CRSP for firm i at time t.
Ei,t is income before extraordinary items but including special items defined as net income plus
discontinued operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.
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(Table 6 continued)
Forecasti,tt-1 is the first consensus analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s announcement for the
current year end for firm i at time t.
LgSIi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with large special items and zero otherwise, where large
special items is defined as total special items that exceed 1% of average total assets for firm i at
time t.
Lossi,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with net income that is less than zero and a zero
otherwise for firm i at time t.
Intgblei,t is an indicator variable that is one for firms with intangible assets that are greater than zero and a
zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
Agei,t is a sum of the number of years since the firm was first listed on Compustat for firm i at time t.
Repi,t is reputation and is an indicator variable of one if the firm is on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired
Companies list and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
R&Di,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and development expense is
greater than zero and a zero otherwise firm i at time t.
Advi,t is an indicator variable of one if the firm’s advertising expense is greater than zero and a zero
otherwise for firm i at time t.
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earnings. In Panel B the analysis is conducted using a version of Eq. (3) that excluded current
earnings and therefore provide an R2 that captures the explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts.
And then in Panel C the analysis is conducted using the full model of Eq. (3) that included both
consensus analysts’ forecasts and current earnings. The analysis is then based on the R2 from the
three versions of the model. Subtracting the R2F in Panel B from the R2EF in Panel C results in
the incremental explanatory power of earnings as reported in Panel A. Subtracting the R2E in
Panel A from the R2EF in Panel C results in the incremental explanatory power of analysts’
forecasts as reported in Panel B, and it is this estimation that is of most interest. Assuming,
market participants understand the relation between Aligned Firms and earnings persistence the
incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts should be lower for Aligned Firms as
compared to Misaligned Firms. Lower incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts for
Aligned Firms is consistent with H3.
The results presented in Table 6 (Panel B) show the incremental explanatory power of
analysts’ forecasts for the Top Partition to be 0.1788 and 0.2604 for Aligned and Misaligned
Firms respectively, and for the Bottom Partition 0.1730 and 0.1943 for Aligned and Misaligned
Firms respectively. As the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is higher for
Misaligned Firms in both the Top and Bottom Partitions, the results support H3. I interpret these
findings to suggest that market participants are aware of the relation between Aligned Firms and
earnings persistence and in settings where misalignment occurs investors seek out additional
information beyond the information contained in earnings, specifically relying on the “new”
information provided in analysts’ forecasts.
Table 7 examines the impact alignment has on the relation between abnormal returns and
unexpected earnings. In this analysis the variable of interest is the interaction of unexpected
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TABLE 7
Tests of the market reaction to firm alignment where actuals equaled or beat forecast by 1 cent or less
AbReti,t = ω0 + ω1UEi,t + ω2Aligni,t + ω3(UEi,t*Aligni,t) + ω4FirmSizei,t + ω5Lossi,t + ω6Betai,t + ω7DtoEi,t + ω8Analystsi,t + ε4i,t
Panel A: Abnormal return based on decile portfolios formed using Scholes-Williams' betas
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Intercept
0.442 ***
0.552
0.316
UEi,t
7.661 ***
6.978 **
4.588
Aligni,t
-0.594 ***
-0.567 ***
-0.318
UEi,t*Aligni,t
-7.374 **
-6.811 *
-5.174
FirmSizei,t
-0.038
0.008
Betai,t
0.025
0.157
DtoEi,t
0.008
-0.025
Analystsi,t
0.013
-0.010
Industry and year dummies
Included
Adj R2
0.1959
0.1624
0.2881

Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
-0.039
-1.835
-1.192
1.771
-7.653
-7.643
1.445 **
1.171 **
1.329 **
20.806 **
19.873 **
24.315 ***
0.019
-0.035
1.044 ***
1.006 ***
-0.066
-0.241 *
0.031
0.059
Included
0.1273
0.3668
0.5484

Panel B: Abnormal return based on decile portfolios formed using firm size
Top Partition (Top 25% GM)
Bottom Partition (Bottom 25% GM)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Intercept
0.392 **
0.263
0.030
-0.009
-1.987
-1.328
UEi,t
8.088 **
6.913 **
4.733
3.607
-6.295
-6.181
Aligni,t
-0.595 ***
-0.592 **
-0.321
1.371 **
1.113 **
1.299 **
UEi,t*Aligni,t
-7.727 *
-7.052
-4.821
18.553 *
18.097 **
22.225 **
FirmSizei,t
-0.024
0.039
0.021
-0.033
Betai,t
0.111
0.252
1.122 ***
1.101 ***
DtoEi,t
0.013
-0.022
-0.026
-0.225 *
Analystsi,t
0.014
-0.013
0.030
0.064
Industry and year dummies
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.1478
0.1303
0.2998
0.1167
0.3866
0.5808
The reduced sample consists of 3,151 firm-year observations for 648 firms covering the period from 2002-2011, and *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Model 1 is the base model without any controls, Model 2 includes the controls but
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(Table 7 continued)
excluded the industry and year dummies, and Model 3 is the full model, including all controls as well as the industry and year dummies.
AbReti,t is the daily compounded return from one day after the prior periods announcement date to one day after the current period’s
announcement date less the mean return from the portfolio decile for firm i at time t.
UEi,t is unexpected earnings calculated as current period earnings less the first consensus analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s
announcement for the current year end for firm i at time t.
Aligni,t is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.
FirmSizei,t is the natural logarithum of the market value of equity for firm i at time t.
Betai,t is the firm beta as defined by Scholes-Williams (1977) for firm i at time t.
DtoEi,t is the debt to equity ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total equity for firm i at time t.
Anlaystsi,t is the number of analysts following the firm as reported by IBES for firm i at time t.
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earnings with Aligned Firms (UEi,t*Aligni,t). For the analysis presented in Table 7 the data is
parsed into four groups based on the accuracy of forecasted earnings as compared to reported
earnings. These four groups are as follows: large miss, defined as actual earnings per share
(EPS) being more than one cent below consensus analysts’ forecasts; miss, defined as EPS that is
between one cent below consensus analysts’ forecasts and meeting consensus analysts’ forecasts;
meet or beat, defined as EPS that is between consensus analysts’ forecasts and one cent above
consensus analysts’ forecasts; and exceed, defined as EPS that is more than one cent above
consensus analysts’ forecasts. Within each of these four groups the data is then parsed into the
Top or Bottom Partition based on gross margin percentage. After conducting the analysis, the
interaction term (ω3) was insignificant for all groups except for the meet or beat group. As such
only the meet or beat group is reported in Table 7.
For Table 7 Panel A the calculation of abnormal returns is based on the creation of ten
portfolios formed using the Scholes-William (1977) betas. For the Top Partition the coefficient
on the interaction term (ω3) declines in significance as the controls are added, and once all
controls are included that coefficient is insignificant. However, in the Bottom Partition the
coefficient remains significant in all version of the model. These results do not provide support
for H3 in the Top Partition but support H3 in the Bottom Partition. These results show that
alignment is important for the cost leader but less important for the differentiator.
In Table 7 Panel B the calculation of abnormal returns is based on the creation of ten portfolios
formed using firm size. For the Top Partition the coefficient on the interaction term declines in
magnitude and in significance as the controls are added, and once all controls are included the
coefficient is insignificant. However, in the Bottom Partition the coefficient remains significant
in all version of the model. These results do not support H3 in the Top Partition but support H3
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in the Bottom Partition. As above in Panel A these results suggest alignment is most important
for the cost leader but less important for the differentiator, which is consistent with the results
presented in Table 6. I interpret these findings to indicate that every cost must be carefully
managed by the cost leader and therefore any cost that does not align with the minimal cost
structure is a hindrance to the firm. For the differentiator, the results suggest that the perception
of uniqueness within the product can be created in many ways, and while employee and
customer relations, is an important avenue it is not the only option.

43

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
In this paper I examine the impact of the alignment of a firm’s employee and customer
relations with the firm’s competitive strategy on earnings persistence and the market’s reaction
to this relation. I use a subset of the KLD ratings to assess firm alignment, specifically the
qualitative areas of employee relations and product quality. These ratings serve as a proxy for
the firm’s focus on employee and customer relations, respectively. To determine alignment the
firm’s focus on employee and customer relations must be evaluated within a competitive context,
namely the classification system described by Porter (1998). By narrowing the sample to only
include differentiators and cost leaders the study has a sound theoretical foundation upon which
to conduct the analysis. To operationalize Porter’s classification system I partition the sample
based on gross margin percentage, with the top 25% of the distribution designated as
differentiators and the bottom 25% as cost leaders.
Because the testing will be based on firms with a focus on either employee relations,
customer relations, or both, I begin by demonstrating that combining employee and customer
relations together is a reasonable approach. By testing that a focus on employee and customer
relations alone will not drive an increase in earnings persistence, the study shows it is the
alignment of a firm’s focus that is critical in the relation with earnings persistence. I then
examine the key firm characteristics of: firm size, the level of firm indebtedness, the level of firm
growth, and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance and consider the impact each of
these characteristics have on earnings persistence. My results suggest that firm size and growth
are of little importance when considering the alignment of a firm’s focus and its competitive
strategy. However, for cost leaders, the characteristics of leverage and corporate governance are
impacted by firm alignment.
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In an effort to further my understanding of firm alignment I tested the market’s reaction
to alignment employing two different tests. First I considered the implications of firm alignment
on the incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts. In conducting this analysis I use the
full model that is then compared to two variations of that model. The interpretation of the
analysis relies on the difference in the R2 between the different versions of the model. By
examining the differences in the R2, I am able to estimate the incremental explanatory power of
analysts’ forecasts and show that incremental explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is lower
for Aligned Firms as they have more persistent earnings. I also test the market’s reaction to firm
alignment by examining the relation between abnormal earnings and unexpected earnings when
reported EPS meets or beats consensus analysts’ forecasts by one cent or less. These results
show investors in the Bottom Partition place more confidence in unexpected earnings for
Aligned Firms than for Misaligned Firms.
Taken as a whole this study demonstrates that firm alignment plays a role in earnings
quality and that alignment is a useful characteristics to investors. When firms are not aligned,
investors rely more heavily on the efforts of financial analysts to provide a deeper understanding
of the firm beyond the information provided by earnings alone. As with any study this analysis
is subject to weaknesses. It is possible that proxies used do not adequately represent the
constructs intended as such the inferences are erroneous; however, given the theoretical
underpinnings of the study I do not believe this to be the case. It is also possible that
circumstance may exist where it is optimal for a firm to choose to be misaligned. Such cases
work against the findings herein and an examination of these cases will be left for future
research. Additionally, as suggested by Kim et al. (2012), the use of subcategories of KLD
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ratings provides a fertile academic research space, and one that needs to be further explored with
future studies.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions
Aligned Firms

having an assessment greater than zero in the KLD category of “Employee
Relations”, “Product Quality” or both for firms in the Top Partition, or having a zero
in KLD’s assessment of “Employee Relations” and “Product Quality” for firms in the
Bottom Partition.

Misaligned Firms

having a zero in KLD’ assessment “Employee Relations” and “Product Quality” for
firms in the Top Partition, or having an assessment greater than zero in the KLD
category of “Employee Relations”, “Product Quality” or both for firms in the Bottom
Partition.

Top Partition

is the top quartile of firms after the firms were ordered based on gross margin
percentage from highest to lowest.

Bottom Partition

is the bottom quartile of firms after the firms were ordered based on gross margin
percentage from highest to lowest.

AbReti,t

is the daily compounded return from one day after the prior periods announcement
date to one day after the current period’s announcement date less the mean return
from the decile for firm i at time t.

Advi,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one if advertising expense (Adv1) was
greater than zero and a zero otherwise firm i at time t.

Adv1i,t

is calculated as advertising expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t.

Agei,t

is an indicator variable having a value of one if firm age (Age1) is greater than the
sample median and a zero otherwise firm i at time t.

Age1i,t

is the sum of the number of years since firm i was first listed on Compustat at time t.

Aligni,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is an Aligned Firm and a
zero otherwise for firm i at time t.

Anlaystsi,t

is the number of analysts following the firm per IBES for firm i at time t.

Betai,t

is the firm beta as defined by Scholes-Williams (1977) for firm i at time t.

DtoEi,t

is total debt divided by total equity for firm i at time t.

Ei,t

is net income plus discontinued operations and income taxes all scaled by total assets
for firm i at time t.

FirmSizei,t

is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for firm i at time t.

52

Govi,t

is an indicator variable having a value of one if the net KLD rating for corporate
governance, measured as the number of strengths minus the number of concerns is
greater than zero and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.

Ind_Dummiesi,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm is included in the industry
portfolio and a zero otherwise, where the industry portfolios is one of the twelve
Fama French industry portfolios defined by SIC code.

Intgblei,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with intangible assets that
are greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.

Levi,t

is an indicator variable having a value of one if long-term debt scaled by total assets
is larger than the median for the sample and zero otherwise for firm i at time t.

LgSIi,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with large special items and
zero otherwise, where large special items is defined as total special items that exceed
1% of average total assets for firm i at time t.

Lossi,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one for firms with net income that is less
than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at time t.

MBi,t

is an indicator variable having a value of one if the market-to-book equity ratio is
larger than the median for the sample and zero otherwise, where the market-to-book
equity ratio is calculated as the market value of equity over book value of equity for
firm i at time t.

Repi,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one if firm i is on Fortune’s America’s
Most Admired Companies list and a zero otherwise at time t.

R&Di,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one if the firm’s research and
development expense (R&D1) is greater than zero and a zero otherwise for firm i at
time t.

R&D1i,t

is research and development expense divided by net sales for firm i at time t.

Sizei,t

is an indicator variable having a value of one if the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity is smaller than the median for the sample and zero otherwise for firm
i at time t.

UEi,t

is unexpected earnings calculated as current period earnings less the first consensus
analysts’ forecasts provided after the prior year’s announcement for the current year
end for firm i at time t.

Yr_Dummiesi,t

is an indicator variable having the value of one if the observation is for the given year
and a zero otherwise.
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